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Cognition (2012), doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.0On the one hand, it is often assumed that the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is constrained by a
structural body model so that one cannot implement supernumerary limbs. On the other
hand, several recent studies reported illusory duplication of the right hand in subjects
exposed to two adjacent rubber hands. The present study tested whether spatial con-
straints may affect the possibility of inducing the sense of ownership to two rubber hands
located side by side to the left of the subject’s hand. We found that only the closest rubber
hand appeared both objectively (proprioceptive drift) and subjectively (ownership rating)
embodied. Crucially, synchronous touch of a second, but farther, rubber hand disrupted the
objective measure of the RHI, but not the subjective one. We concluded that, in order to
elicit a genuine RHI for multiple rubber hands, the two rubber hands must be at the same
distance from the subject’s hand/body.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since its (re)discovery by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) has become the experimental tool
for investigating the sense of body ownership. But why do we feel ownership towards the rubber hand in the RHI? Our only
access to the rubber hand is visual. We do not even see the rubber hand in contiguity with our body. It could be anybody’s
hand. The only difference between anybody’s hand and this speciﬁc rubber hand is the spatio-temporal correlation between
the observed stroking of the rubber hand and the felt stroking of our biological hand. It has been argued that it is precisely
multisensory correlation that is at the source of the sense of body ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Holmes, &
Passingham, 2005; Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Morgan & Rochat, 1997; Rochat, 1998).
However, as it stands, the hypothesis of intermodal matching leaves many questions unanswered. In particular, the sense
of body ownership cannot derive from any kind of intermodal correlation. Imagine that you see and hear two hands clapping.
Despite visuo-auditory correlation, you do not feel these hands as your own. You also need visuo-auditory information to
correlate with proprioceptive and tactile information indicating that you, and nobody else, are clapping your hands. In other
words, there must be information that is self-speciﬁc (e.g. somatosensory information) for intermodal correlation to play a
role for ownership. Yet, even the involvement of self-speciﬁc information does not always sufﬁce, as shown by a series of
recent RHI studies (see Table 1).. All rights reserved.
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Table 1
Constraints that lay upon intermodal matching in the RHI.
Factors That prevent the RHI That do not prevent the RHI
Temporal Asynchronous stimulation Cf. Botvinick and Cohen (1998)
Spatial Mismatch in direction of strokes (in hand-centered frame)
Cf. Costantini and Haggard (2007)
Mismatch in posture (orientation)
Cf. Pavani, Spence, and Driver (2000), Tsakiris and Haggard
(2005), Guterstam et al. (2011)
Mismatch in location (distance from the torso)
Cf. Armel and Ramachandran (2003), Lloyd (2007)
Anatomical Mismatch in anatomical shape (hand-shaped) Mismatch in visual appearance (monstrous arms, skin tone, etc.)
Cf. Tsakiris et al. (2010) Cf. Austen, Soto-Faraco, Enns, and Kingstone (2004); Longo,
Cardozo, and Haggard (2008)
Mismatch in hand laterality with mismatch in hand location
(e.g., left RH on the left with right biological hand)
Mismatch in hand laterality with no mismatch in hand location
(e.g., left RH on the right with right biological hand)
Cf. Tsakiris and Haggard (2005) Cf. Petkova and Ehrsson (2009)
Mismatch in size if rubber hand is smaller
Cf. Pavani and Zampini (2007)
Mismatch in size if rubber hand is bigger Cf. Pavani and Zampini
(2007)
2 A. Folegatti et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxxAnother counterexample is mirror reﬂection. When you look at your reﬂection in the mirror while combing your hair, you
have self-speciﬁc somatosensory information that matches visual information. Yet, one may doubt that you really feel own-
ership towards the hand in the mirror in the same way that you feel ownership towards the rubber hand in the RHI. You
know this is the reﬂection of your own hand, but the phenomenology does not seem to include a kind of primitive immediate
feeling of mineness. What is then the difference between the RHI and mirror recognition? There is one striking difference
between the rubber hand and your body reﬂection in the mirror: you feel tactile sensations on the rubber hand; you do
not feel tactile sensations on the head that you see in the mirror when you comb your hair. One may then suggest that
the ownership feeling of the rubber hand is grounded in the spatial content of tactile sensation. On this view, it is because
touch is experienced as being located on the rubber hand that the rubber hand is experienced as your own. On the other
hand, if the body in the mirror is not experienced as your own, it is because no sensation is experienced as being located
there. This interpretation of the RHI is in line with a dominant theoretical approach to body ownership, also known as
the spatial account of ownership (de Vignemont, 2007), which highlights the importance of the spatiality of bodily
sensations.
There are several versions of the spatial account. Martin (1995) reduces the sense of ownership to the awareness of the
boundaries of one’s own body. He argues that the spatial structure of bodily experiences is such that sensations are neces-
sarily experienced within the boundaries of one’s own body. Indeed, in bodily sensations, there is nothing that does not fall
within the limits of the bodily space. By contrast, the boundaries of the object that I see are not co-extensive with the visual
ﬁeld. Consequently, the body that I see does not bear the ‘‘indelible stamp of ownership’’ (Brewer, 1995). Martin’s spatial
account is exclusively at the phenomenological level. Alternatively, one may defend a representationalist view of body own-
ership, which aims at singling out the speciﬁc type of representation of the bodily space that grounds the sense of ownership
(e.g., Carruthers, 2008; de Vignemont, 2007; Tsakiris, 2010).
For example, Tsakiris (2010) defends the view that ownership is constrained by what he calls a body model, deﬁned as a
‘‘reference description of the visual, anatomical and structural properties of the body’’. However, a number of questions
about the body model remain open. Does it represent the human body in general or more speciﬁcally, the subject’s individual
bodily parameters? Is there only a single model of the body as a whole or several models of parts of the body? How ﬁne-
grained is it? The answers to these questions are of importance. The body model is indeed supposed to determine what
can or cannot be experienced as one’s own. In other words, only objects that meet the description ‘‘given’’ in the body model
can be processed as if they were parts of one’s body. If the body model depicts anatomical properties and if it plays a role in
the RHI, and thus in the sense of body ownership, then one can make the following predictions: (i) one can experience as
one’s own only objects that look like body parts (i.e. body part constraint); (ii) one can experience as one’s own only bodily
shape objects of identical laterality (i.e. laterality constraint); (iii) one can experience ownership only for two hands, and not
more (i.e. two-hand constraint). The ﬁrst prediction received so far some support. It was found that one could not induce the
RHI with objects that do not present the visual appearance of a body part (Haans, Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris, Car-
penter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). The laterality constraint, however, is more controversial. On
the one hand, Tsakiris and Haggard (2005) found no RHI when a right rubber hand was visually presented close to the
stroked left biological hand. However, Petkova and Ehrsson (2009) were recently able to induce the RHI with a difference
in hand laterality by introducing spatial separation between the stroked biological hand and the rubber hand. A right rubber
hand was placed on the table, while the right biological hand was hidden behind a screen. The left biological hand was placed
in full view, but participants were instructed to look at the rubber hand. Both the left biological hand and the right rubber
hand were stroked. Despite the incongruence between the hands laterality, participants reported feeling touch on thePlease cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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elicit (i.e. longer stimulation time and illusion on fewer participants). It therefore seems that the RHI can violate the hand
laterality constraint posited by the body model.
The last prediction is that there can be only two hands experienced as one’s own, a left hand and a right hand, and no
more. The recently documented ‘‘supernumerary hand illusion’’ (SHI) constitutes a rather obvious violation of the two-hand
constraint (Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011). In this new illusion, participants saw both their own hand and a rubber
hand being stroked (unlike the classic RHI in which only the rubber hand is in full view). They reported feelings of touch
on both the rubber hand and the biological hand. Furthermore, they reported ownership for the rubber hand without induc-
ing either subjective response or objective response (skin conductance) indicating disownership of the biological hand. As
there is no way the rubber hand can replace the biological hand, the solution the brain ﬁnds is to appropriate both hands.
This is, however, a clearly different situation of intermodal correlation than in the classic RHI. Arguably, the plasticity of
body representation may follow different principles depending on the perceptual context. Here we will exclusively focus on
the two-hand constraint in the context of the classic RHI. There are then two ways to assess its validity. First, one can inves-
tigate the fate of the biological hand to determine whether the rubber hand replaces the biological hand, thus keeping the
number of hands at two (Folegatti, de Vignemont, Pavani, Rossetti, & Farnè, 2009; Moseley et al., 2008). Second, one can test
the possibility to simultaneously embody multiple rubber hands (Ehrsson, 2009; Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010). The dif-
ﬁculty is that results in both cases remain inconclusive. There is no evidence yet that the ownership of the rubber hand is
accompanied by the disownership of the biological hand. At the physiological and behavioral level, it was found a decrease in
skin temperature of the biological hand following the RHI, as well as a slowing down of tactile processes on the biological
hand (Folegatti et al., 2009; Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Moseley et al., 2008). These results have been interpreted by Moseley and
colleagues as evidence that the biological hand was replaced by its artiﬁcial counterpart. However, a similar slowing down of
tactile processes was found following prismatic displacement (Folegatti et al., 2009). What the two experimental situations
have in common is the visuo-proprioceptive conﬂict: participants see their hand in a different location than where they feel
it. On the basis of these ﬁndings, we suggested that it is the visuo-proprioceptive conﬂict per se that modiﬁes tactile percep-
tion, rather than disownership. Thus, it is not clear whether the biological hand is disowned or not, and thus whether one can
experience more than two hands as one’s own in the RHI.
A more deﬁnite answer can be found in studies using multiple rubber hands. Ehrsson (2009) reported illusory duplication
of the right limb in subjects exposed to two adjacent rubber hands placed side by side above their biological hand, which was
hidden below the table. When the two rubber hands were synchronously stroked with the biological hand, participants re-
ported feeling touch on the two rubber hands and sometimes feeling as if the two rubber hands were their own. When any of
the two rubber hands was stabbed by a needle, Ehrsson found a signiﬁcant increase of the skin conductance response (SCR).
He concluded that one could embody more than two hands. Newport et al. (2010) introduced a novel multiple hand illusion
by using an active version of the RHI (i.e. active stroking of the paintbrush) in which videos of the subjects’ own left hand
were taken online to double the visual feedback of the subjects’ biological left hand (unseen). Each hand was displayed
slightly shifted (either leftward or rightwards compared to the biological hand) while the biological hand performed active
movements to stroke the bristles of a toothbrush. When compared to a baseline condition where subjects only saw one hand
displayed, the results indicated that participants reported feeling as if the two ‘rubber’ hands were their own. Overall these
ﬁndings go in line with the pathological syndrome of supernumerary limbs. Some patients indeed experience the presence of
one or two phantom hands or legs, in addition of their own biological hands and legs (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). It may thus
seem that we can be quite generous with our sense of ownership. We would not be limited to own two hands, but we could
stretch our body limits and include three or even four supplementary hands (i.e. two rubber hands and two biological
hands).
It may, however, be too early to draw such conclusion, especially on the basis of the described results. On the one hand,
Ehrsson did not ask participants to rate their ownership illusion in a questionnaire. Furthermore, the set-up of his experi-
ment prevented him to use the classic objective measure of the RHI, namely, the proprioceptive drift. The only measure
he exploited was the SCR. But he never threatened both rubber hands at the same time. Hence, one cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that participants were ‘insensitive’ to the unthreatened rubber hand (or the subjects’ biological hand, see Guterstam
et al., 2011) when their autonomous system reacted to threat. On the other hand, the study by Newport and colleagues did
use a questionnaire, but it is difﬁcult to judge to what extent the results can be attributed to pure ownership because of the
concomitant presence of an active movement (i.e. active stroking). Action might bring a new variable in the equation,
namely, the sense of agency. Interestingly, they found that participants did not embody both displayed hands simulta-
neously in a subsequent motor task (i.e., to reach a target). Furthermore, one might wonder to what extent such an appara-
tus, displaying the exact visual appearance and movement of the subjects’ biological hand, does not result into a mixture of
the classic RHI and the SHI.
The aim of our paper was to determine the spatial constraints that lay upon the RHI by re-evaluating the possibility of
multiple RHI. In particular, we kept the set-up of the experiment as close as possible as the classic RHI set-up. We then ana-
lysed in detail the interaction between the two rubber hands in light of their respective spatial location. To this end, we
tested four different groups of healthy subjects in four separate experiments. In all experiments, two right rubber hands
were presented in a position compatible with the subject’s biological right arm, one rubber hand being farther than the other
from the biological hand (hereafter, fRH for the farthest rubber hand and cRH for the closest rubber hand). We manipulated
the number of hands that were stimulated, and the synchronicity between the rubber hands and the biological hand, as wellPlease cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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of RHI. For both measures, we predicted equal or additive illusory effects when two, instead of only one RH were stroked
synchronously with the participants’ biological hand.
In their original paper, Botvinick and Cohen (1998) noted: ‘‘While the Rubber Hand Illusion does not tell us precisely what
ingredient might make only certain forms of intermodal correlation relevant to the self, it does show that intermodal match-
ing can be sufﬁcient for self-attribution’’. In this paper, we propose that the ‘ingredient’ in intermodal correlation that con-
stitutes the mark of body ownership in the RHI can be found in the representations of the body boundaries. More
particularly, we distinguish between two types of such representations, what we call the prototypical body (what is per-
ceived as our own body with maximal degree of certainty) and the borderline body (what is perceived as potentially our
body).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Forty-three subjects participated to the study. Nine healthy naïve participants (5 females, mean age 27.6 years; all right-
handed) took part in our ﬁrst experiment. A different group of 12 (7 females, mean age 23.8 years) participated in the second
experiment. A group of 10 (5 females, mean age 25.6 years) was tested in experiment three and another group of 12 healthy
participants (7 females, mean age 26.3 years) took part in experiment 4. All gave their informed consent to participate in the
study that was conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the INSERM ethics committee.
2.2. Experimental design
Participants sat at a table with a one-way/two way mirror as surface. Their right hand was hidden from view under an
obscured part of the glass. In full view they could see two rubber hands representing realistic reproductions of two right
hands with forearm one placed rightward and the other leftward with respect to the participant’s body midline. The former
was thus closer to the biological hand (cRH) while the latter was farther (fRH). Lights were switched on and off under the
mirror to make the rubber hands visible or to hide them. The distance between the participant’s hand and the closest rubber
hand was 15 cm, identical to the distance between the two rubber hands (all measures taken with respect to the stimulated
middle ﬁnger). The rubber hands were slightly oriented anti-clockwise, to maximize posture plausibility with respect to the
participant’s right elbow. See Fig. 1.
Prior to multisensory stimulation, the participant was required to judge the position of her middle ﬁnger on a ruler, re-
peated six times. Then she was instructed to ﬁxate a point located halfway between the two rubber hands during 2 min of
visuo-tactile stimulation. Immediately after the visuo-tactile stimulation, the judgment of the ﬁnger position on the ruler
was repeated and a questionnaire was administered to provide a subjective measure of the features and the vividness of
the illusion.
This setup was designed to include four experimental manipulations.
In experiment 1 the participant’s hand was brushed synchronously or asynchronously with the cRH (the closest rubber
hand). The fRH (the farthest rubber hand) laid unstimulated (see Fig. 1A).
In experiment 2, the participant’s hand was brushed synchronously or asynchronously with the fRH while the cRH laid
unstimulated.
In experiment 3, the fRH was touched both in synchrony and asynchrony with cRH, which itself was synchronously or
asynchronously touched with the biological hand. As a result, we had three conditions: (1) both rubber hands synchronousFig. 1. Set-up in experiment 1 (panel A) and 2–3 (panel B). The pictures represent an actor who consented to be photographed for illustrative graphical
purposes.
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logical hand and cRH asynchronous with the biological hand.
In experiment 4, the cRH was synchronously touched with the biological one, giving raise to three conditions: (1) both
rubber hands synchronous with the biological hand, (2) both rubber hands asynchronous with the biological hand, (3)
cRH synchronous with the biological hand and fRH asynchronous with the biological hand (see Fig. 1B).
2.3. Proprioceptive judgment
Participants were required to estimate the position of their hidden right middle-ﬁnger by means of a ruler reﬂected on the
mirror and appearing to be at the same depth as the hands (see Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005 for this method). They were in-
structed to report the number on the ruler corresponding to the position of their ﬁnger by mentally projecting a parasagittal
line from the ﬁnger to the ruler. During proprioceptive judgments the lights under the mirror were switched off to make the
rubber hand invisible while only the ruler was visible. Participants were required to repeat the judgment six times, with the
ruler always presented with a random offset in order to avoid response strategies. The mismatch between the true position
of the ﬁnger and the number indicated by the participant was calculated and resulted in a positive number if the displace-
ment was towards the rubber hand and a negative number if it was away from it. This procedure allowed measuring the drift
of the perceived position of the participant’s own hand towards the rubber hand, a well established measure of the RHI (Bot-
vinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). When the cRH alone was touched, we expected to observe a drift compa-
rable to that found in previous studies using the classical RHI setup, or alternatively a smaller drift if the presence of a second
unstimulated fRH represented an obstacle for the induction of the RHI. When the fRH alone was touched, we expected to
observe a smaller drift with respect to the previous condition due to the larger distance of this RH from the biological hand,
as distance is known to decrease the strength of the RHI (Lloyd, 2007). When both rubber hands were touched in synchrony
with the biological hand, we had two predictions: if both rubber hands can be embodied at the same time we should ﬁnd an
additive effect of the two rubber hands on the drift (so a larger drift), or at least the same drift as in experiments 1 and 2 if
one of the rubber hands dominates on the other. If the two rubber hands cannot be embodied at the same time then we
should expect to ﬁnd no drift.
2.4. Visuo-tactile stimulation
After the judgment, the ruler was removed and the lights under the mirror were turned onto make the rubber hand(s)
appear. A 2-min stimulation with identical paintbrushes followed. The real hand was stimulated with the rubber hands
by means of two stepper motors through touches delivered along the dorsum of the middle-ﬁnger.
Experiments 1 and 2 consisted of two blocks characterized by different visuo-tactile conditions while experiments 3 and
4 consisted of 3 blocks with 3 different visuo-tactile conditions each, as described above. A resting period of 5 min was ob-
served between blocks and their order was counterbalanced between participants.
The proprioceptive judgment was repeated after each 2 s-epoch of visuo-tactile stimulation.
2.5. Questionnaire
At the end of each block participants were required to complete a questionnaire, rating their agreement with eight state-
ments describing the RHI experience (questions were slightly different for experiment 3 and 4, due to the differences in the
setup, although they were all comparable between experiments, except for question 4, see Appendix). Participants were
asked to judge their level of agreement with each statement by drawing a mark on a 14 cm long continuous line in which
the left extreme indicated complete disagreement and the right extreme indicated complete agreement. For the question-
naire, we had similar predictions as for the proprioceptive drift. A level of agreement comparable to the classical RHI, or
smaller, when the cRH alone was touched in synchrony with the biological hand, as compared to asynchronously. A smaller
agreement when the fRH alone was touched alone. When both rubber hands were touched in synchrony with the biological
hand we expected an additive effect and then a stronger agreement when compared to experiment 1 and 2 if both rubber
hands can be embodied at the same time, or at least the same level of agreement as in experiment 1 and 2 if one of the rubber
hands dominates on the other. Finally, we expected little or no agreement if the two rubber hands cannot be embodied at the
same time.
The full questionnaire is reported in Appendix.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Experiment 1
We performed an ANOVA on the mean error of the proprioceptive judgment (the displacement of the subjective from the
objective location of the ﬁnger position, measured in cm). For this analysis we considered the variables synchrony (synchro-
nous/asynchronous) and session (pre/post visuo-tactile stimulation). The variable session was signiﬁcant [F(1,8) = 11.69,Please cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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wards, that is toward the rubber hands (3.13, SD = 2.96 vs. 6.36, SD = 5.05 in the synchronous condition and 3.54,
SD = 3.32 vs. 4.57, SD = 4.25 in the asynchronous condition; p < .01 for all comparisons). As illustrated in Fig. 2, the signiﬁcant
interaction synchrony  session [F(1,8) = 9.01, p = .02] was due to the fact that the proprioceptive drift was larger following
synchronous than asynchronous stimulation (p = .008).
Thus, the net proprioceptive drift attributable to the RHI amounts to 1.79 cm, which is comparable with that observed in
previously published works on the RHI (e.g. Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), and in particular with our previous study (Folegatti
et al., 2009, Experiment 1: 1.2 cm of net proprioceptive drift) in which the same apparatus was used, but no second rubber
hand was displayed.
In order to have a subjective measure of the illusion of ownership of the rubber hand we also performed an analysis of the
mean values of agreement to the questionnaire with an ANOVA considering the variables synchrony of the stimulation (syn-
chronous/asynchronous) and the variable question (question 1–8). The results are illustrated in Fig. 3. Both variables consid-
ered were signiﬁcant: synchrony [F(1,8) = 7.63, p = .02] and question [F(7,56) = 15, p = .0001], as well as their interaction
[F(7,56) = 6.65, p = .0001]. Participants expressed stronger agreement with the proposed questions after synchronous
(4.5 cm, SD = 3.40) than asynchronous stimulation (2.0 cm, SD = 1.22). More in details, they strongly agreed with questions
1, 4 and 7 after synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, but signiﬁcantly less after asynchronous stimulation (p < .001 for all
comparisons), while agreement to questions 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 did not differ after the two kinds of stimulation. Question 1 is
related to the localization of touch (touch is perceived as caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand), and questions
4 and 7 are related to the feeling of ownership for the touched rubber hand (the touched rubber hand belongs to the par-
ticipant and is more her own as compared to the untouched rubber hand). Questions 2 and 3 relate to a different location
of touch (touch is perceived as coming from a point between the participant’s own hand and the closer rubber hand or from
a point between the two rubber hands), and questions 5, 6 and 8 relate to the feeling of ownership involving also the un-
touched rubber hand (participants feel like they have more than 2 hands; both rubber hands belong to them; both rubber
hands begin to resemble to their own hands). As expected, we observed stronger agreement for statements which locate the
origin of touch on the touched rubber hand and expressing a feeling of ownership for the touched (as compared to the un-
touched) rubber hand.
We thus conclude that it is possible to induce the classical Rubber Hand Illusion, as measured both through a subjective
report (questionnaire) and an objective measure (proprioceptive drift), also when a second (unstimulated) rubber hand is
present and placed in a plausible position with respect to the subject’s body. The mere presence of an additional rubber hand
has no notable effects on the appearance of the illusion of ownership for the stimulated rubber hand or the localization of
touch on it.
3.2. Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, we performed a repeated measure ANOVA, with synchrony and session as independent variables (see
previous experiment), on the proprioceptive drift (in cm). The variable session [F(1,11) = 9.5, p < .01] and the interaction syn-
chrony  session [F(1,11) = 5.16, p < .05] were signiﬁcant, showing a signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift following synchronous
stimulation (1.45, SD = 2.35 vs. 4.08, SD = 2.76, p < .01) while the drift following asynchronous stimulation was not signiﬁ-
cant (2.26, SD = 1.51 vs. 2.76, SD = 1.58) (see Fig. 4).
2The level of agreement with the items of the questionnaire was submitted to the ANOVA as in experiment 1, with syn-
chrony and question as independent variables. Both variables and their interaction were signiﬁcant: synchrony
[F(1,11) = 5.30, p < .05]; question [F(7,77) = 10.82, p < .0001]; interaction synchrony  question [F(7,77) = 2.74, p < .01]. As
in experiment 1, participants expressed stronger agreement for questions 1, 4 and 7 following synchronous than asynchronous
stimulation; (see Fig. 5: question 1: 8.4, DS = 5.07 vs. 3.5, DS = 3.86, p < .01; question 4: 7.39, DS = 4.76 vs. 3.15, DS = 3.20,Fig. 2. Experiment 1, proprioceptive drift. Mean displacement (in cm) in the proprioceptive judgment task, as a function of session (pre–post) and
synchrony (Synch–Asynch) of the visuo-tactile stimulation. Asterisk denotes statistically signiﬁcant difference (p < .05).
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Fig. 3. Experiment 1, questionnaire. Mean level of agreement with the questionnaire statements (for speciﬁc questions, see Appendix). Asterisks denote
statistically signiﬁcant difference (p < .05).
Fig. 4. Experiment 2, proprioceptive drift. Mean displacement (in cm) in the proprioceptive judgment task, as a function of session (pre–post) and
synchrony (Synch–Asynch) of the visuo-tactile stimulation. Asterisk denotes statistically signiﬁcant difference (p < .05).
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differ.
The ﬁndings of experiment 2 thus show that, despite being relatively far from the subject’s hand, at the limits of what
Lloyd (2007) indicated as the space suitable to induce an effective RHI, it is possible to induce an illusion of ownership also
for the fRH. In addition, this holds true despite the presence of a second, unstimulated rubber hand located in between the
participant’s and the farthest rubber hand. This conclusion is jointly supported by the measure of the proprioceptive drift
and the questionnaire.
In line with Lloyd’s observation, indicating an inverse relationship between the increasing of the distance between the RH
and the real hand and the strength of the illusion, the amount of proprioceptive drift in the synchronous condition was
numerically smaller in experiment 2 compared to experiment 1 (2.63 cm vs. 3.23 cm), although this difference did not reach
statistical signiﬁcance. In addition, in both experiments these amounts were signiﬁcantly higher than the shifts observed in
the asynchronous condition. Moreover, the results obtained from the questionnaire are fully comparable across experiments
1 and 2 (compare Figs. 3 and 5). Overall, these ﬁndings demonstrate a genuine and consistent RHI for both the close and far
RH, when present simultaneously but stimulated singly, thus constituting the optimal condition for testing whether both
rubber hands can be owned jointly, when co-stimulated (experiments 3 and 4 below).
3.3. Experiment 3
In an ANOVA on the proprioceptive judgment with synchrony [3 levels: both rubber hands synchronous (SS)/both asyn-
chronous (AA)/fRH synchronous and cRH asynchronous (SA) with the biological hand] and session (pre/post visuo-tactilePlease cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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Fig. 5. Experiment 2, questionnaire. Mean level of agreement with the questionnaire statements (for speciﬁc questions, see Appendix). Asterisks denote
statistically signiﬁcant difference (p < .05).
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jects slightly and non-signiﬁcantly tended to judge their hand as being closer to the rubber hands following both synchro-
nous (SS) and asynchronous (AA) stimulation of the two rubber hands. The amplitude of this non-signiﬁcant drift (0.6 cm,
SD = 1.94 in SS and 1.1 cm, SD = 2.13 in AA) was small and comparable to the drift typically induced by asynchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation, as for example in Experiment 1 (1 cm). Noteworthy, the synchronous stimulation of fRH coupled
with asynchronous stimulation of cRH (SA), did not produce any signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift.
Interestingly, the questionnaire showed a differential effect of the kind of visuo-tactile stimulation on the illusion of own-
ership (see Fig. 7). The variable question [F(7,63) = 6.88, p < .0001], and the interaction between synchrony and question
[F(14,126) = 2.88, p < .001] were signiﬁcant. In particular, the stronger agreement concerned questions 1 (comparison SS–
AA with Newmann–Keuls post hoc p < .01) and 2 (comparison SS–AA with Newmann–Keuls post hoc p < .05), relative to
the localization of touch on the rubber hands, and question 7 (for both comparison SS–AA and SA–AA with Newmann–Keuls
post hoc p < .001), which was relative to the feeling that one rubber hand was perceived as more owned by the subject than
the other one. Systematically questioned on the latter point, all subjects reported feeling the cRH as being more part of their
body than the fRH.
To sum up, when a second rubber hand is added further leftward to the classical RHI setup, and it is also stroked in syn-
chrony with the subjects’ biological right hand, the proprioceptive drift does not testify the presence of an illusion of own-
ership. Noteworthy, this conclusion holds true irrespective of whether the cRH is stroked asynchronously or synchronously
with the fRH. However, the subjective measure of the feeling of ownership, as rated in the questionnaire, clearly indicated
that participants felt the cRH as their own (more than fRH) both when the rubber hands were synchronously stroked and
when they were asynchronously stroked (see Table 2). Thus, it could be suggested that the synchronous stimulation of
fRH and cRH was insufﬁcient to bring about ownership of the two rubber hands in terms of proprioceptive drift, but itFig. 6. Experiment 3, proprioceptive drift. Mean displacement (in cm) in the proprioceptive judgment task, as a function of session (pre–post) and
synchrony (SS–AA–AS) of the visuo-tactile stimulation.
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Fig. 7. Experiment 3, questionnaire. Mean level of agreement with the questionnaire statements (for speciﬁc questions, see Appendix A). Asterisks denote
statistically signiﬁcant differences (p < .05).
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anisms can be responsible of the subjective illusion of ownership and its objective measurement via the proprioceptive drift
(see Holmes & Spence, 2007; Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011).
3.4. Experiment 4
In the fourth experiment, we evaluated the effect of the visuo-tactile stimulation [both rubber hands synchronous with
the biological hand (SS)/both asynchronous (AA)/fRH asynchronous and cRH synchronous (AS)] on the proprioceptive judg-
ment (pre/post visuo-tactile stimulation) by running the same ANOVA as in experiment 3. Fig. 8 illustrates that the propri-
oceptive drift differed signiﬁcantly between pre and post stimulation (session [F(1,11) = 5.98, p > .05], interacting
signiﬁcantly with the kind of visuo-tactile stimulation (interaction synchrony  session [F(2,22) = 3.84, p > .05]. The post
hoc analysis (Newmann–Keuls) showed that, as a consequence of the synchronous stimulation of the cRH with the biological
hand, while the fRH was stroked asynchronously, the judgment of the subjects’ ﬁnger position was signiﬁcantly misplaced
leftwards, that is to say toward the rubber hands, relatively to all the other conditions (p < .005 for all comparisons). Again,
the net amount of proprioceptive drift (1.3 cm) was comparable to that obtained both in our previous work (Folegatti et al.,
2009) using the same set-up (1.2 cm) and with that observed here in Experiment 1 (1.7 cm). In sharp contrast, and similar to
experiment 3 here above (see Table 2), no signiﬁcant proprioceptive displacement was observed either when both rubber
hands were stroked asynchronously (AA) or even synchronously (SS) with the subjects’ biological right hand (p > .2 in all
comparisons).Table 2
Results summary.
Experiment Condition Proprioceptive drift Questionnaire items
1 cRH S
cRH A
2 fRH S
fRH A
3 c & f RH SS
c & f RH AA
fRH S & cRH A a
4 c & f RH SS
c & f RH AA
fRH A & cRH S a
The presence of the RHI is here reported as a function of experiment (1–4) and condition of visuo-tactile stimulation
(S = synchronous; A = asynchronous with the participant’s hand) according to whether signiﬁcant ( ) or non-sig-
niﬁcant ( ) changes in position sense (proprioceptive drift) and sense of ownership (questionnaire items) were
observed.
a In this condition, participants reported the cRH was more their own than the fRH.
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Fig. 8. Experiment 4, proprioceptive drift. Mean displacement (in cm) in the proprioceptive judgment task, as a function of session (pre–post) and
synchrony (SS–AA–SA) of the visuo-tactile stimulation. Asterisk denotes statistically signiﬁcant differences (p < .05).
Fig. 9. Experiment 4, questionnaire. Mean level of agreement with the questionnaire statements (for speciﬁc questions, see Appendix A). Asterisks denote
statistically signiﬁcant differences (p < .05).
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showed a different level of agreement with the various questions [F(7,77) = 6.71, p < .0001] and following the different kinds
of visuo-tactile stimulation [F(2,22) = 8.64, p < .01]. When both rubber hands were stimulated synchronously (mean
3.36 cm) with the biological hand or the closer one synchronously and the further one asynchronously (mean 3.25 cm),
the agreement to the questionnaire was higher than when they were both stimulated asynchronously with the subjects’ bio-
logical hand (mean 1.09 cm, p < .005 for both comparisons). Fig. 9 illustrates this difference, which was signiﬁcant for ques-
tions 1, 4, 7 (comparisons SS–AA and AS–AA, p < .05 for all questions) and 8 (comparison SS–AS, p < .001). As in the previous
experiment, the feeling of ownership was clearly attributed to the closest RH.
4. Discussion
Our study aimed at deepening our understanding of the critical constraints for multiple embodiment of rubber hands. In
order to do so, we used a novel variation of the RHI, in which two right-handed rubber hands (cRH, which is close to the
biological hand and fRH, which is farther on the left) were simultaneously visible while the subject’s biological right hand
was unseen. In our analysis of the results, we distinguished within the RHI the contribution of a subjective component,
which was assessed by the questionnaire, and an objective component, which was measured by the proprioceptive drift.
Our results can be summarized into three main conclusions: (1) the RHI, as eye-witnessed by both proprioceptive drift
and questionnaire, is not affected by the mere visual presence of an additional (unstimulated) rubber hand, irrespective
of the closeness of the latter with respect to the real hand; (2) but the RHI is affected by the simultaneous stimulation of
an additional rubber hand, whether it is synchronous or asynchronous; (3) the interference due to the simultaneous stim-
ulation of an additional rubber hand differs as a function of the measure considered (i.e., questionnaire or proprioceptive
drift). After describing these results in details, we will discuss possible explanations and their implications.Please cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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found an illusion of ownership of the stimulated rubber hand, as reﬂected at the subjective level by the questionnaire rating
and at the objective level by the proprioceptive drift. So, the mere visual presentation of a second rubber hand in the exper-
imental setup, even in a plausible position, did not prevent the emergence of a full RHI. This was true even if the rubber hand
that was stimulated was the farthest (fRH), despite the fact that it was 30 cm apart from the biological hand and that the cRH
was halfway in between the biological hand and the fRH.
However, when participants also saw the second rubber hand being touched, the scenario changed profoundly. In Exper-
iments 3 and 4, when both rubber hands were touched in synchrony, we observed no subjective or objective indication of
RHI for the fRH. As for the cRH, the results are more contrastive. On the one hand, the synchronous stimulation of both rub-
ber hands made the proprioceptive drift disappear. On the other hand, participants reported feeling as if the cRH were their
own hand, as indicated by the questionnaire. Unlike the objective measure of the RHI (proprioceptive drift), the subjective
measure (questionnaire) was thus immune to the stimulation of the additional rubber hand. In this respect, whatever the
combination of the synchronous touch with the biological hand, that is both rubber hands synchronous (SS, experiment 3
and 4), or the farthest synchronous and the closest asynchronous (SA, experiment 3) or vice versa (AS, experiment 4, see
Table 2), a consistent feeling of ownership for the closest RH was uniformly observed. Consequently, the objective and
the subjective measures of the illusion can be dissociated when using multiple rubber hands, thus strengthening our own
previous ﬁndings (Folegatti et al., 2009; see also Holmes & Spence, 2007). A recent interesting study has further investigated
this dissociation and called into question whether the proprioceptive drift alone can be considered as a counterpart of the
RHI (Rohde et al., 2011). According to the authors, the proprioceptive drift relies exclusively on visuo-proprioceptive inte-
gration. This process normally takes place even by simply looking at an unstimulated rubber hand, but it can be inhibited
by asynchronous stroking. Although of broad interest for our understanding of the RHI phenomenon, this dissociation does
not fully account for our results. In particular, it does not explain why the double synchronous stimulation in experiment 3
and 4 does not induce any proprioceptive drift.
Two further conditions are of interest: condition SA in Experiment 3 and condition AS in Experiment 4. In condition SA,
the fRH was stimulated in synchrony with the biological hand, unlike the cRH. In other words, only the stimulation of one
rubber hand correlated with the stimulation of the biological hand. Yet, this failed to induce any proprioceptive drift, or clear
feeling of ownership for the fRH. The condition AS was exactly the reverse. The cRH was stimulated in synchrony with the
biological hand, unlike the fRH. This led to a proprioceptive drift comparable to that obtained for cRH when stroked alone
(Experiment 1, see Table 2). As for the subjective RHI, both SA and AS induced to some extent some ownership feelings, pri-
marily directed at the cRH in both cases.
To recap, we could induce a RHI for cRH and for fRH alone when two rubber hands were present, but only in some cir-
cumstances. We elicited a proprioceptive drift for the cRH in Experiment 1 (when only the cRH was stroked) and in Exper-
iment 4 (when the fRH was stroked in asynchrony). On the other hand, when considered only on the basis of this objective
measure, the RHI was apparently suppressed by the synchronous stimulation of the fRH in both Experiments 3 and 4. In
addition, we elicited a proprioceptive drift for fRH in Experiment 2 (when only the fRH was stroked), but we failed to do
so in Experiment 3, no matter whether the cRH was stroked in synchrony or asynchrony.
What is noticeable in our study is that the simultaneous stroking of the two rubber hands and the biological hand deter-
mined a change in the objective measure of the RHI, and this in two ways: (i) full suppression of the drift itself, when the
second rubber hand was also touched in synchrony (SS condition in experiment 3 and 4), and (ii) weakening of the drift
(AS condition, experiment 4). Indeed, the amount of proprioceptive drift, even when statistically signiﬁcant, was weaker
when both rubber hands were touched (AS: 1.2 cm) than when only one rubber hand (cRH S) was touched (3.2 cm; t-test
for independent groups = 2.26; p < .04).
At odds with the objective indication of the RHI, the subjective measure, as derived from the questionnaire, did not seem
as sensitive in distinguishing between different combinations of stroking of the rubber hands. Indeed, the subjective illusion
of ownership was consistently present across the four experiments, with only small variations when comparing Experiments
3 and 4 with experiments 1 and 2, where only one RH was ‘touched’. In both Experiments 3 and 4, subjects expressed a feel-
ing of misplacement of the origin of touch, as if it originated from the cRH, and a strong feeling of ownership for the cRH.
Even when there was no proprioceptive drift (experiment 3), some sense of ownership was observed in the questionnaire,
although limited to the cRH. More interestingly, a comparable feeling was also reported for the two rubber hands when they
were both synchronously stroked, but again the subjective illusion of ownership appeared to be mainly directed toward the
cRH. Noteworthy, across the three experiments subjects never declared to feel ownership for both rubber hands (question 6),
whatever the experiment and the conditions of stimulation. When asked towards which of the two rubber hands the feeling
of ownership was stronger, they consistently attributed it to the cRH. Still, a weakening of the illusion of ownership is
numerically evident also in the questionnaire scores, when comparing them to the scores of experiment 1 and 2: participants
were more likely to refer touches to the rubber hand and to have a stronger feeling of ownership of one of the two rubber
hands in experiment 1 and 2 relative to experiments 3 and 4, although this difference was not statistically signiﬁcant.
In summary, our series of experiments made clear that, when considering the classic objective measure of the RHI, it is
not possible to simultaneously embody two rubber hands, at least with our set-up. Instead, when considering the subjective
experience of the illusion, a diminished, but signiﬁcant sense of ownership can be obtained, but stronger for the cRH. So why
in our experiments is it possible to induce only a mitigated RHI for two rubber hands? And why the stroking of a secondPlease cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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to rule out two possible explanations.
First, one may be tempted to explain our results by the location of the fRH. According to Lloyd’s study (2007) the strength
of the RHI decreases with the rubber hand being located at distances larger than 27.5 cm. In our study, the fRH is located
30 cm far from the subject’s hand, therefore just beyond this limit. However, the stimulation of the fRH alone produced a
signiﬁcant proprioceptive drift and signiﬁcant agreement with the ownership questionnaire. Although numerically smaller,
the proprioceptive drift elicited by stroking the fRH alone was statistically comparable to the one observed after stroking of
the CRH alone. In any case, if the inﬂuence of the fRH were still weaker, simply because it was located far from the subject’s
hand, then the condition SS should produce a normal proprioceptive drift at least for the cRH, but this was the case neither in
Experiment 3 nor in Experiment 4. It is worth noting that the asynchronous stimulation of the fRH did not prevent the emer-
gence of a genuine RHI for the cRH (experiment 4, AS condition), suggesting that an active process intervened in the SS con-
dition to prevent the establishment of the RHI, even for the cRH.
Alternatively, one may offer an attentional explanation of these puzzling results: the RHI was prevented in the SS condi-
tion because there was something driving attention away from the cRH. However, the attentional drift should apply also to
the AS condition of Experiment 4. There should be a disturbing effect of ‘‘attention moving’’ away from the cRH also when
the latter was touched in synchrony with the subject’s hand. Yet, this did not prevent the RHI to emerge in the AS condition.
Conversely, synchronous stimulation of the fRH was not attracting enough attention to establish a RHI for that hand, even
when the cRH was touched asynchronously with the subject’s hand (experiment 3, SA condition). Therefore, attentional
shifts can neither account for the whole pattern of results.
If our results cannot be explained by the location of the farthest rubber hand or by attentional effects, then how can one
explain that we fail to replicate other studies that were able to induce RHI for multiple rubber hands (Ehrsson, 2009; New-
port et al., 2010)? In Ehrsson’s study, the measure of the proprioceptive drift was made impossible by the experimental de-
sign. There was no spatial separation between the two rubber hands, which were located side by side above the subject’s
unseen hand. The RHI was measured through subjective reports and SCR. Having repeatedly found a dissociation between
the subjective feeling of ownership and the proprioceptive drift, one may argue that the SCR is possibly a better behavioral
correlate of the RHI. However, this remains controversial (de Vignemont, 2011). Arguably, increased SCR is a consequence of
the sense of ownership. However, it is a logical fallacy to claim that the antecedent in an indicative conditional is true be-
cause the consequent is true. In other words, the increase of SCR in the synchronous condition compared with the asynchro-
nous condition cannot be taken as evidence of ownership. It could be if and only if SCR was an exclusive measure of
ownership (a measure M of a process P is exclusive if M obtains if and only if there is P). However, SCR can hardly qualify
as an exclusive measure of ownership since it is also affected by many factors, including empathy, attention, and so forth.
All in all, it is possible that the spatial proximity of the two rubber hands is the key differential element enabling double
RHI in Ehrsson’s study (see Körding et al., 2007). The side-by-side set-up might cast doubts on the simultaneous embodiment
of the two rubber hands, indeed, one cannot fully exclude the possibility that the reaction to the threat did not arise for both
rubber hands simultaneously.
Likewise, the experimental setup and procedures in Newport and colleagues’ study are basically different from ours and
from the typical RHI set-up in general. They induced a RHI for the subject’s own hand reduplicated via a video system, and
produced it through observation of an active movement of the hand(s) repeatedly stroking a toothbrush. Moreover, the illu-
sion was quantiﬁed subjectively, with a questionnaire, and objectively, with a subsequent pointing task. Pointing errors pro-
vide an indirect measure of the misplacement of the perceived position of the hand itself (see also Holmes, Snijders, &
Spence, 2006, for a similar approach without active induction of RHI). Interestingly, while a subjective feeling of ownership
was reported through the questionnaire for the video images of both hands moving in synchrony, only the video image of
one hand inﬂuenced the trajectory of the pointing movement. Owing to this dissociation, the authors concluded that the sub-
jective feeling of ownership reﬂects the incorporation into the body image, which can concern more than one rubber hand at
a time, whereas the pointing task requires an update of the body schema, which can concern only one limb at a time. How-
ever, we cannot use the dissociation between the body image and the body schema to explain the present results. In partic-
ular, our way of testing the proprioceptive drift is not appropriate (and was not meant to) tackle the body schema. It relies on
perceptual estimation with no link to action.
To conclude, the success in establishing the subjective feeling of ownership for multiple rubber hands in other studies
seems to underline the need for the two rubber hands (or the real hand and the rubber hand, see Guterstam et al., 2011) to
be at the same distance from the subject’s hand/body. This spatial condition, which was clearly violated in our experiments,
might thus be crucial. Even by considering the fRHI as being possibly weaker in its proprioceptive component (numerically,
though, but not statistically) when compared to the cRHI, the synchronous stroking of both rubber hands, had a clear suppres-
sive impact on the possibility of inducing RHI proper (i.e., both objectively and subjectively) even for the cRH. Our study sug-
gests that this suppressive mechanism could depend on the plausibility of information coming from different sensory
modalities: if multisensory signals cannot be integrated in a plausible percept then the RH cannot be perceived as part of
the subject’s body. This can be true also when speaking of the subject’s own hand, as recently proved by Newport and Gilpin
(2011) whowere able to induce a sensation of loss of ownership of the real limb through the disintegration of sensory signals.
Such a kind of suppressive mechanism could be useful in maintaining a distinction between self and other bodies and its dis-
ruption could be responsible for neuropsychological deﬁcits such as misoplegia or somatoparaphrenia.Please cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
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tween three types of spatial representations: (i) the space of what belongs to our body, (ii) the space of what can belong
to our body and (iii) the space of what can affect our body. This distinction cannot be reduced to the opposition between
the personal space and the peripersonal space, frequently found in the literature (Brozzoli, Gentile, Petkova, & Ehrsson,
2011; Halligan & Marshall, 1991; Làdavas, di Pellegrino, Farnè, & Zeloni, 1998; Làdavas & Farnè, 2004). One difﬁculty with
this classic dichotomy is that it is unclear how and where to draw the boundary between the personal space and the peri-
personal space (Cardinali, Brozzoli, & Farnè, 2009). For example, it is sometimes unclear whether rubber hands are included
within the personal space (Tsakiris, 2010), or within the peripersonal space (Makin et al., 2008). The same debate can be
found about the embodiment of tools (Cardinali et al., 2009; Holmes & Spence, 2004; see also de Vignemont & Farnè,
2010 and de Vignemont, 2011 for discussion).
In contrast, our distinction leaves no ambiguity. It clearly takes apart what is part of the body, what can be part of the body
and what is external to the body, but still relevant for it. Arguably, the brain computes the boundaries of the biological body,
but taking into account some margin of spatial errors, thus creating a gray zone of possibilities of body ownership. The per-
ceived boundaries of our body are thus relatively vague. We may compare it to the perception of colors. Some shades of color
are clearly identiﬁed as yellow, others are clearly identiﬁed as green, but there are some in between for which the categoriza-
tion oscillates between yellow and green. Furthermore, the context can inﬂuence the categorization of the borderline cases.
Likewise one may suggest that there is a prototypical body (what is perceived as our own body with maximal degree of
certainty) and a borderline body (what is perceived as potentially our body). The borderline body corresponds to a spatial
overestimation of the boundaries of our body, a gray zone that seems to go as far as 27.5 cm from the biological body (Lloyd,
2007). From an evolutionary perspective, it is indeed safer to overestimate the boundaries of one’s body than to underesti-
mate them. One may further suggest that the constraints that lay upon the gray zone differ from the constraints that lay
upon the clearly identiﬁed space of our biological body. In particular, the two-hand constraint may not apply. This would
explain why Ehrsson and Newport and colleagues succeeded in inducing multiple RHI. The space above and beyond the gray
zone should not be considered as completely irrelevant for the body. On the contrary, it could inﬂuence the boundaries of the
gray zone by giving perceptual and social context. We suggest that the inﬂuence of this contextual space occurs at the level
of the decision criteria that are exploited by the brain in order to decide whether a limb belongs to one’s body or not. For
instance, one may easily conceive that the limits of the gray zone shrink when one is surrounded by many people. In the
presence of other limbs, one has better use stricter decision criteria to avoid confusion. The suppression of the proprioceptive
drift for the cRH in our experiments may reﬂect this general principle, which could be exploited by the brain in operational
terms: the fRH could be close enough to subjectively think it could be part of my body, but too far to affect proprioceptively
based decision such as moving or not. To conclude, our ﬁndings indicate that a further constraint for the cRH to be experi-
enced as one’s own hand is that no other hands are synchronously touched at a distance, even when such a distance is suf-
ﬁcient for the fRH (alone) to be experienced as one’s own.
In conclusion, and despite the previous reported ﬁndings, it does not appear so obvious to induce a double ownership of
two rubber hands when they are not located at the same distance from the biological hand. When sticking to a situation as
close as possible to the classic RHI studies, like in our experiments, the presence of a stimulated second rubber hand actually
seems to actively suppress the illusion and prevent its emergence. We suggest that, if the RHI is the result of the solution of a
multisensory conﬂict, conﬂict there is only when it is plausible (one rubber hand, or two rubber hands located side by side).
In an implausible situation, like with two (or more) right rubber hands located far apart, the conﬂict is solved in a more con-
servative way, by preventing embodiment also for the closest rubber hand. We offered here a new conceptual framework to
interpret these complex results, revising the classic dichotomy between the personal space and the peripersonal space.
Rather, we speculated that the perception of bodily boundaries should be construed in the same way as categorical percep-
tion, which allows for prototypical instances and borderline instances, the categorization of the latter being inﬂuenced by the
context. Similarly, one should distinguish the prototypical body and the borderline body, the sense of ownership of the latter
being inﬂuenced by the peripersonal space.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire experiment 1–2/experiments 3–4:
1. It seemed as if the touch I were feeling was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand/s.
2. It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush somewhere between my own hand and the touched rubber
hand/the rubber hand closer to it.
3. It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush somewhere between the two rubber hands.Please cite this article in press as: Folegatti, A., et al. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Two’s a company, but three’s a crowd. Consciousness and
Cognition (2012), doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.02.008
14 A. Folegatti et al. / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012) xxx–xxx4. It seemed as if the touched rubber hand was my hand/the touch I were feeling was caused by the paintbrush touching one
of the rubber hands more than the other. (Which one?).
5. It seemed as if I might have more than two hands.
6. I felt as if the rubber hands were my hands.
7. I felt as if one of the rubber hands were more my hand than the other. (Which one?).
8. It seemed as if the rubber hands began to resemble to my own hand, in terms of dimension, shape, skin tone or some
other visual feature.
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